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PREFACE 
This study -was initiated as Subtask 3, Orbiting Propel lant Depot Safety Study 
of NASA Study C-II, Advanced Missions Safety Studies. Other studies in this 
se r ies a r e : (i) Subtask 1, TNT Equivalency Study, Aerospace Report No. 
ATR-71 (7233)-4; and (ii) Subtask 2, Safety Analysis of P a r a l l e l ve r sus Ser ies 
Propel lant Loading of the Space Shuttle, Aerospace Report No. ATR-71 (7233)-1. 
The study was supported by NASA Headquar ters and managed by the Advanced 
Missions Office of the Office of Manned Space Flight. Mr. Herber t Schaefer, 
the Study Monitor, provided guidance and counsel that significantly aided this 
effort. 
Study reso l t s a re presented in three volumes; these voluraes a re summar ized 
as follows: 
Volume I: Management Summary Report p resen t s a brief, concise 
review of the study content and summar i zes the principal conclusions 
and recommendat ions . 
Volume II: Technical Discussion provides a discussion of the 
available test data and the data ana lys i s . Details of an analysis 
of possible vehicle static failure modes and an a s se s smen t of 
thei r explosive potentials a r e included. Design and procedura l 
c r i t e r i a a r e suggested to minimize the occur rence of an explosive 
fa i lure . 
Volume III: Appendices contains supporting analyses and backup 
m a t e r i a l . 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Under considerat ion, a re orbi tal miss ions that r equ i re the use of vehicles 
other than Space Shuttles, e. g. , a c is lunar shuttle, that is ei ther chemically 
or nuclear propelled, space tugs functioning as shuttles which can serv ice 
orbiting payloads or veh ic les . Such vehicles may be spaced-based . In this 
operational mode, the vehicles would be stationed in a low ear th orbit from 
which they would initiate and t e rmina te fl ights. The only t ime these vehicles 
might re tu rn to ear th would be for major main tenance . 
The flight frequency of these vehicles indicates that l a rge quantities of p ro -
pellants will have to be del ivered to them in orbi t . Orbiting propellant depots , 
in both geocentric and selenocentr ic o rb i t s , a re being considered as candidate 
methods of making the requi red propel lants readily avai lable . Therefore , as 
an initial par t of the evaluation of this concept, an a s s e s s m e n t of the potential 
safety hazards associa ted with the operation of such a depot (OPD) is des i rab le . 
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2. STUDY OBJECTIVE AND CONSTRAINTS 
2. 1 OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this study was to provide safety guidelines and requ i rements 
for the operation of an Orbiting Propel lant Depot. 
2.2 CONSTRAINTS 
Because conceptual configurations of the OPD were not to be , and have not 
been, developed in depth, this study was limited to a top level qualitative 
safety analysis of the g ross depot r equ i rement s . However, cer ta in orbiting 
vehicle (OV) concepts had to be taken into considerat ion, such as a Space 
Shuttle that would be launched from ear th by a booster stage and c a r r y 
orbiting vehicle(s) such as (a) change-of-plane shutt les , (b) tugs , or (c) other 
vehicle which might be maintained and/or refurbished in (geocentric) orbit 
or might be re turned to ear th for same. 
Preceding page blank 
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RELATION TO OTHER NASA EFFORTS 
This study provided safe ty-re la ted c r i t e r i a which will be useful in assess ing 
configuration proposa ls for OPD. The c r i t e r i a will provide safety guidelines 
and requi rement inputs for future system design tasks and a baseline against 
which design p r o g r e s s can be weighed relat ive to safety. 
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METHOD OF APPROACH 
The genera l plan followed in this study included: 
a. Development of conceptual orbiting propel lants depot 
configurations. 
b. Asses smen t and comparison of conceptual gross levels 
of safety. 
c. Establ ishment of recommendat ions as to safety requ i rements 
and c r i t e r i a for normal and emergency operations. 
Preceding page blank 
PRECEDMG FAGS BLi^S NC? *1 
5. RESULTS 
5. 1 GENERAL 
This study is applicable to an Orbiting Propel lan ts Depot (OPD) located in 
geocentr ic or selenocentr ic o rb i t s . Since there was no firm design approach, 
th ree configurations were examined in an effort to bracket the design concepts . 
In the t h r ee concepts studied, the OPD was posited as being unmanned and 
the u se r or resupply vehicle as manned. 
Prope l lan ts for the OPD would be del ivered by a space shuttle to an OPD in 
geocentr ic orbit; however, an additional flight would be required to deliver 
propel lants to an OPD in a se lenocentr ic orbit . 
5. 2 CONCEPTS 
The distinguishing features of the three concepts a re discussed in the following 
pa rag raphs . A comparison of the concepts , indicating advantages and d i s -
advantages, is given in Table 1. 
5. 2. 1 Integral 
In the in tegral concept, the propellant s torage tanks form a permanent par t 
of the p r i m a r y s t ruc ture of the OPD. All propel lants received or dispensed 
by the OPD must uti l ize the OPD propellant t ransfer subsystem. 
5. 2. 2 Semimodular 
In the semimodular concept, as shown in Fig. 1, a cent ra l core contains all 
subsys tems required for operation of the OPD. Arranged around the core is 
a s e r i e s of docking por ts which accept modularized propellant s torage tanks 
for resupply of the OPD; empty tanks a r e re turned to earth by a resupply OV 
and a r e recycled. The concept is s imi la r to the integral concept with respect 
to the dispensing of the propel lants . 
Preceding page blank 
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CHARACTERISTICS 
i MODULAR OPD WITH CENTRAL MANIFOLDING AND SUBSYSTEMS 
ii MODULAR RESUPPLY WITH INTEGRAL TRANSFER TO USER VEHICLE 
Figure 1. Semimodular Concept 
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5. Z. 3 Modular 
The modular concept i s s imi la r to the semimodular concept both in configuration 
and method of resupply, i. e. , a centra l core to which the propellant modules 
a r e docked (Fig. 1). It differs from the in tegral and semimodular concepts 
in that no fluid flow is required to dispense propel lants . The user OV being 
serviced exchanges i ts empty propellant tanks for full tanks . The empty tanks 
would be s tored at the OPD until they were re turned to ear th by a resupply 
OV for recycle . 
5. 3 HAZARD ANALYSIS 
The analysis cons iders operat ional sequences in which personnel a r e subjected 
to safety haza rds . These events could occur in two main operational phases : 
a. OPD resupply 
b. Propel lant t ransfer from the OPD to a user OV 
Top-level failure mode and effect analyses were performed for the major 
events occurr ing in these phases . NASA hazard ca tegor ies , ranging from 
catas t rophic to negligible, we re used to g ross ly classify those of the study. 
As each hazard was evaluated, preventive and remedia l c r i t e r i a were 
developed. Preven t ive c r i t e r i a a r e meant to be utilized as inputs to design 
and operat ions documents to prevent or minimize the possible occurrence(s) 
of the fai lure(s) . Remedial c r i t e r i a suggest contingency or backout procedures 
to be employed after a fai lure has occur red . Tables Z and 3 contain typical 
examples of hazard ana lyses . 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6. 1 CONCLUSIONS 
1. The semimodular depot concept appears to be the safest 
and operationally the most flexible of the configurations 
analyzed. 
2. A completely open-s t ruc tured depot is des i rab le , i. e. , no 
p r e s s u r i z e d a r e a s other than the s torage tanks; where 
enclosed a r e a s cannot be avoided, the capability to purge 
these a r e a s is des i rab le . 
3. Coaxial propellant t ransfe r lines or para l le l loading of 
propel lants is not recommended. 
4. Pos i t ive identification of LO_/LH ? t r ans fe r interfaces is 
requi red . 
5. Unique fittings should be used at the LO_/LH ? t r ans fe r 
in terfaces to preclude c ro s s coupling of the propellant 
tanks. 
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Studies of flame propagation and explosive phenomena in 
space would be valuable in the event that the r e su l t s of 
this study a r e to be expanded. 
2. The explosive studies should address the problem of 
possible fai lure because of debr is following an explosion. 
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